




Elizabeth Cary’s Female Trinity: Breaking Custom 
with Mosaic Law in The Tragedy of Mariam
Cristina León Alfar
In Act One, scene three of Elizabeth Cary’s The Tragedy of Mariam, Salome takes a stand. Unlike other women in the play to whom, I 
will argue, she is linked by the inequity of Mosaic law, Salome resolves 
to appropriate the law and claim divorce as a female right: “I’ll be the 
custom-breaker: and begin / To show my sex the way to freedom’s door, / 
And with an off ’ring will I purge my sin; / The law was made for none but 
who are poor. ”1 With these words, Salome conceives of a revolution that 
would free, as she puts it, the play’s female characters.2 For she is not alone 
in her marital unhappiness, nor is she the only female character to come 
face-to-face with Mosaic law. Doris, wife to Herod prior to Mariam, suffers 
the humiliations attendant on wives who have been divorced by husbands 
arbitrarily. And Mariam, who hates her husband, has no recourse against 
him, no way to separate from him that will allow her to retain her prized 
virtue. In its depiction of these three women’s experience of marriage, the 
play reveals an ideal performance of wifely duty as an ideological construc-
tion that depends on fictive rewards and punishments. The stability that 
humanists such as Juan Luis Vives hope to guarantee women who perform 
that ideal consequently becomes impossible to guarantee: Salome’s lack 
of, and contempt for, virtue goes unpunished; virtue fails to win Mariam 
honor, fails, in fact, to guarantee her life; and Doris’ virtue and devotion to 
Herod fail to guarantee her security as a wife. Thus, life, death, and divorce 
are divided from punishment, and we are asked to view these harsh out-
comes as unpredictable and unjust.3 Because for Salome “shame is gone, 
and honour wip’d away” (1.3.293), a space opens in which she can imagine 
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divorcing a husband she no longer loves, usurping for herself powers that 
belong only to men.4 
Cary’s Judaic Palestine resembles early modern England insofar 
as English common law granted legal rights to husbands that it did not 
officially grant to wives, and those rights granted to husbands gave them 
significant economic powers over their wives. The result was a system 
in which husbands’ potential abuse of their legal rights might place 
wives in vulnerable positions. Cary’s Mosaic law, therefore, stands in for 
Renaissance English marriage law. While both Doris and Mariam are 
abandoned by Herod, Salome faces a different dilemma. Her marriage to 
Constabarus stands in the way of her wish to marry the Arabian prince, 
Silleus. Challenged by what she sees as an unequal distribution of legal 
rights that tie her unwillingly to a man she no longer loves, Salome rebels 
against laws she finds lacking in logic and justice. Locating the inequity 
between men and women in Mosaic law that bars women from divorcing 
their husbands while allowing husbands to divorce their wives, Salome 
rejects the constraints placed upon her as a married woman and seizes the 
opportunity of legal indeterminacy created by Herod’s presumed death to 
inform Constabarus, “Thou shalt no hour longer call me wife, / Thy jeal-
ousy procures my hate so deep: / That I from thee do mean to free my life, 
/ By a divorcing bill before I sleep” (1.6.417–20).5 
Of course, Salome’s arrogation of power makes her masculine in 
Constabarus’s eyes, turning his “world . . . topsy-turvèd quite” (1.6.424). 
He expresses the conventional masculine anxieties of the early modern 
period about female nature, reaffirming as natural a sex-gender system 
that putatively guarantees systems of power and inheritance. But because 
women’s sexual natures are often seen by men as uncontrollable, such a 
guarantee is illusory. While the play stages masculine anxieties in their full 
force in Constabarus’s rage at Salome and in Herod’s execution of Mariam 
for what he believes is her adultery and concomitant treason against him, 
it also dramatizes the profound costs to married women in a legal system 
that does not represent them. In so doing, the play rejects male views such 
as those of Constabarus.6 Thus, giving voice to women who suffer the 
brunt of masculine anxieties, The Tragedy of Mariam privileges what I will 
call “feminine anxieties” in its depiction of all the female characters, espe-
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cially in the trinity of Mariam, Doris, and Salome. By depicting women 
who defy convention, the play stages women’s multiple perspectives on, 
reactions against, and appropriations of patrilineal systems of law, custom, 
and power.7 Doris is both justifiably angry and determined in her hatred 
of Mariam. Mariam is both innocent of Herod’s accusations and guilty of 
hubris. Salome completes the triangle of complex and contradictory female 
characters in her simultaneous attempt to choose affection over duty and 
her brutal deployment of systems of law and power. Together, the three 
women expose the callous and one-sided nature of the law and identify 
the material basis for feminine anxieties.8 Rather than offering us a single, 
unqualified response to the tyranny of Herod and Mosaic law, Cary offers 
us a range of experiences and responses, all of which contribute to the 
stories of early modern women’s lives. In this way, the play presents a com-
plex, three-tiered approach to women’s perceptions of law and marriage. I 
emphasize as equal the roles of Mariam, Doris, and Salome under Mosaic 
law in uncovering feminine anxieties staged in The Tragedy of Mariam, a 
drama that replays and resists early modern cultural and juridical policies 
of inequities between husbands and wives and privileges women’s experi-
ences.9
The inequity of Mosaic law, then, forms the basis for feminine anxiet-
ies in the play and resonates within early modern English systems of mar-
riage law. Salome’s understanding of the way these systems of power work 
against women makes her the one who most forcefully states the injustice 
for women in a legal system that “is hostile to [their] interests” and that 
expects of them uncompromising obedience.10 Salome explains Mosaic law 
to her lover, Silleus:
In this our land we have an ancient use,
Permitted first by our law-giver’s head:
Who hates his wife, though for no just abuse,
May with a bill divorce her from his bed.
But in this custom, women are not free,
Yet I for once will wrest it. . . . 
   (1.5.333–8)
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Mariam agrees with Salome’s definition of Mosaic law, asking Doris when 
she is accused of adultery, “Did not Moses say, / That he that being match’d 
did deadly hate: / Might by permission put his wife away, / And take a 
more belov’d to be his mate?” (4.8.587–90). As Shari Zimmerman points 
out, Doris’s response to Mariam is a “deceptively simple question, ‘What 
did he hate me for? ’ ” 11 While husbands have recourse against wives they 
no longer love, not only to divorce those wives but to remarry and raise 
subsequent families, wives enjoy no similar right. In fact, under Mosaic law 
abandoned wives and children live in poverty, without legal rights and eco-
nomic security. Antipater, Herod and Doris’s son, is disinherited, declared 
illegitimate, in effect, while Mariam and her children enjoy the economic 
and social security that was formerly theirs. Not unlike women in the 
period who appealed to the courts of Chancery and of Requests (equity 
courts—complementary to but separate from common law courts—that 
I will examine below), Salome appropriates existing laws for her own pur-
poses to seek equity outside the law. In contrast to Doris, who only grieves 
and threatens revenge, and to Mariam, whose passive aggression animates 
her husband’s violence, Salome acts to change her life.12
A growing number of studies have shed light on the ubiquitous mas-
culine anxieties of the period. Mark Breitenberg’s Anxious Masculinity in 
Early Modern England defines the condition as simultaneously “a signifier 
of cultural tensions and contradictions, but also as an enabling condition 
of male subjectivity in early modern patriarchal culture. ”13 For Breitenberg, 
anxiety is both produced by and produces patriarchy, and the term must 
be “wed” to masculinity because “those individuals whose identities are 
formed by the assumption of their own privilege must also have incorpo-
rated varying degrees of anxiety about the preservation or potential loss of 
that privilege. ”14 Anxiety attaches itself to masculine gender through social 
privilege and construction, not as a biological imperative, but as an effect of 
pressures and constraints specific to men in the period. My interest in fem-
inine anxiety borrows from Breitenberg to read the masculine anxieties he 
studies as productive of and reciprocal with feminine anxieties. Breitenberg 
argues that “in the repetition or staging of anxiety men compensate for an 
anticipated danger that derives from the very patriarchal system in which 
they are engendered as subjects in the first place. ”15 This formation of mas-
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culine anxiety perpetually replicates itself as a mode of social and political 
regeneration and (re)stability, and the anticipation of danger actually pro-
duces that which is feared. Indeed, anxiety, as Breitenberg explains, “may 
be seen as the result of projecting one’s own mental constructions onto 
the world or onto another person and then mistaking them as objectively 
true. ”16 Masculine anxieties, then, may have to do with illusory fears, with 
haunting specters rather than with concrete threats.17 
Breitenberg’s use of the term “anxiety” confronts the phantasmatic 
nature of masculine anxieties in early modern drama and points to the 
formative relationship of power to gender. The threat that women pose 
for men is really a fantasy born out of the competitions for preferment 
and power in which men must engage. In this regard, I wish to underscore 
the actual power men have in contrast to the phantasmatic power men 
attribute to women to suggest that, contrary to masculine anxiety, what 
I am calling feminine anxiety is a response to the real threats arising out 
of masculine anxieties. In other words, what women have to be anxious 
about is the threat to their lives (often but not always a lethal threat) that 
can materialize when fathers, brothers, or husbands suspect them of inap-
propriate or adulterous behavior. I am particularly interested, then, in an 
exaggerated, even paranoid, tendency on the part of male characters to 
see harm where there is none (Herod’s belief in Mariam’s adultery and 
treason is a prime example) and to act against the female characters, often 
in violent ways. By contrast, women in these same plays feel anxiety born 
of men’s violence against them, and therefore their anxiety—as opposed 
to that of the men—is of a concrete and material kind. Feminine anxiety, 
in this regard, is not a projection of women’s mental constructions onto the 
world or another person or a mistaking of them as objectively true, but is 
instead a valid response to their domestic, legal, and political constraints. 
Thus feminine anxieties, like masculine anxieties, are a gendered response 
to a chaotic and unpredictable system of authority that depends on chaste 
female bodies for an imaginary stability. Masculine and feminine anxieties, 
in this regard, depend on an uneasy and conflicting dialectical reciprocity.
The Tragedy of Mariam portrays the right to authority claimed by 
men within a patrilineal structure and varied forms of resistance to that 
authority by women. The potential brutality of the system is embodied 
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in Herod, whose rule is based on violent usurpation and exploitation of 
Mosaic law. That Salome’s rebellion imitates the violence and exploitation 
of her brother should not be a surprise, for if power is a violent attribute 
that in the early modern period is gendered masculine—that is if, as was 
believed, power is handed down in a patrilineal succession from God, to 
King, to Man—then we must expect women who take power to behave 
like men.18 As Judith Butler argues,
Assuming power is not a straightforward task of taking power from 
one place, transferring it intact, and then and there making it one’s 
own; the act of appropriation may involve an alteration of power such 
that the power assumed or appropriated works against the power that 
made that assumption possible. Where conditions of subordination 
make possible the assumption of power, the power assumed remains 
tied to those conditions, but in an ambivalent way; in fact, the power 
assumed may at once retain and resist that subordination. This con-
clusion is not to be thought of as (a) a resistance that is really a recu-
peration of power or (b) a recuperation that is really a resistance. It is 
both at once, and this ambivalence forms the bind of agency.19
I argue that Salome’s ability to conceive of divorce (or “freedom,” as she 
terms it 1.4.310) as a way to separate from her husbands resembles the 
agency Butler proposes. The cultural custom and law in place both restrict 
and enable Salome’s act, so that she simultaneously resists and reproduces 
structures of power in place prior to her desire for liberty. Cary’s play, in 
this respect, offers an alternative not to systems of patrilineal control, but 
to the representation of female characters, to orthodox notions of female 
nature, and to the socio-political and naturalized hierarchy of power 
descending, from God, to King, to Man. As Robert Filmer explains it, “If 
we compare the natural rights of a father with those of a king, we find them 
all one, without any difference at all, but only in the Latitude or Extent 
of them: as the Father over one Family so the King as Father over many 
Families extends his care to preserve, feed, clothe, instruct, and defend the 
whole Commonwealth. ”20 The anonymous author of An Homilie Against 
Disobedience and Willful Rebellion agrees: “[God] not onlye ordayned that 
in families and households the wife shoulde be obedient unto her hus-
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bande, the children unto their parentes, the servantes unto their masters, 
but also, when mankinde increased and spread it selfe more larglie over the 
worlde, he by his holy worde dyd constitute and ordain in cities and coun-
tries severall and speciall governours and rulers, unto whom the residue 
of his people should be obedient. ”21 This patrilineal religious and political 
order, animated by the rebellion of angels against God, forms the crux of 
early modern political and domestic theory.22 It also informs, I will argue 
below, Salome’s mode of agency, for when she decides what she wants, she 
imitates Herod, the play’s primary agent and authority figure. The only 
way for a woman to overcome her anxieties, therefore, is to act, and to 
act—in this play—is to act ruthlessly.
Thus the play’s staging of feminine anxieties interrogates early mod-
ern political, domestic, and moral order. When Cary writes a play whose 
wives struggle with and call into question their obedience to their husbands 
and their relationship to marriage law, and when one of these husbands is 
a king and a tyrant—largely because of his misuse of marriage law—Cary 
launches a simultaneous critique against orthodox forms of marriage and 
monarchy, for the absolute authority of kings and husbands makes of both 
institutions a tyranny against which married women have little recourse.23 
As Rebecca Bushnell has argued, on the Renaissance stage “[t]he tyrant 
figures a kind of improper authority figure that makes authority itself 
problematic, at the same time that the tyrant is destroyed to reestablish 
legitimate sovereignty. ”24 While legitimate rule is not restored in Cary’s 
play—Herod’s reign is always portrayed as usurpation—the tyrant is 
destroyed by and lives to regret his own tyranny. In this sense, Cary’s play 
underscores the problematic nature of authority by allowing the authority 
figure to condemn his use of that authority. What Herod regrets, of course, 
is his execution of his wife. His tyranny, therefore, is linked to his roles 
both as husband and as monarch.25
* * *
As many feminist scholars have noted, early modern conduct manu-
als and legal documents demonstrate masculine anxieties about female 
sexual nature and reflect early modern concerns that, in their emphasis 
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on women’s obedience to men, disclose men’s dependence on women for 
honor. 26 I want to look at a series of documents from the period—writ-
ten by both men and women—to set up a history of feminine anxiety 
in which Cary’s play participates and which may help illuminate early 
modern women’s history in relation to law and marriage. Together, men’s 
and women’s texts map the material instability of wives. They show that 
the laws on divorce—even post-Reformation—and women’s position 
in marriage changed very little from Vives’s The Instruction of a Christen 
Woman (1523) to The Law’s Resolutions of Women’s Rights (1632). While 
The Law’s Resolutions is written much later than either Vives’s Instruction 
or Cary’s play, it makes official for and available to women laws that were 
in effect throughout the sixteenth century. The date of this text, then, is 
less important than what it provides to us as an official account of laws 
relevant to women, especially those having to do with coverture and mar-
riage. Together, The Law’s Resolutions and Vives’s curriculum emphasizing 
virtue act as bookends, revealing themselves to be culturally bound and 
implicated in the religious and political views on monarchical and domestic 
harmony found in An Homilie Against Disobedience and Willful Rebellion 
(1570) and Filmer’s Patriarchia, or The Natural Power of Kings (1616), 
which together span nearly the same period. The texts—some written 
for women to understand their private role and some written for men to 
understand their public role—overlap and intersect on numerous points 
having to do with the family and state structure that are relevant to and 
throw light on The Tragedy of Mariam. I hope that reading these texts 
alongside others written by women over the same period will provide a 
vision, though partial, of married women’s legal and social position in the 
period.
While the view of women Vives holds is as old as Genesis, his par-
ticular version, inflected with humanist interests in education, makes it 
a relevant starting point for thinking about the status of women in early 
modern England. His juxtaposition of education and chastity with obedi-
ence and state authority lays out the contradictory role of women in the 
period and the stakes for both sexes in marriage. There are repeated links 
among education, chastity and obedience, and state authority in all the 
texts I read below, as well as in Cary’s play. The Law’s Resolutions docu-
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ments the complicated lack of rights afforded women under common law, 
regardless of humanist ideals, and in this text, the tie between women’s 
legal rights and religious and monarchical authority resurfaces, showing 
that women’s social position and state power cannot be separated. Despite 
the law’s absolutist basis, common law could be circumvented through 
equity courts, so that opportunities arose for women to manipulate the law, 
to appropriate what Tim Stretton calls its “flexibility” in equity court juris-
dictions, in ways we might compare to Salome’s appropriation of Mosaic 
law as a way to claim divorce for herself and other women.27 In dialogue 
with the well known cultural and social customs and practices of these 
texts, Cary’s play becomes part of women’s history in England, contribut-
ing to our vision of the complexity of women’s relationships to cultural 
ideologies and material laws.
In The Instruction of a Christen Woman, Juan Luis Vives argues that 
“chastyte is the principall vertue of a Woman. ”28 Devoid of the “perle” 
of her virginity and consequently diminished in “pryce,” a woman whose 
reputation is in question faces absolute alienation from everyone she 
knows and, therefore, loss of emotional and economic security.29 But more 
than that, Vives describes graphically how “fathers have cut the throtes 
of theyr doughters, bretherne of theyr systers, and kynnesmen of theyr 
kinnes women. ” In one description, a family “shutte [a doughter] up in a 
stable with a wylde horse, kepte meateles. ” A woman is stabbed by brothers 
after giving birth to an illegitimate child, and another is strangled by her 
female friends.30 While Vives does not actually say that parents, brothers, 
and friends ought to murder guilty young women, his stories affirm the 
violence of masculine anxieties about female sexuality and chastity because 
he makes it clear that such violence is not a “marvail … that the affection of 
love and charite is turned so sodeaynely to hate. ”31
The link between women’s subjection to men and to both their faith 
in God and their obedience and loyalty to the monarch in An Homilie 
Against Disobedience and Willful Rebellion makes disobedience tantamount 
to blasphemy and treason, so that “such subjectes as are disobedient or 
rebellious against their princes disobey God and procure their owne 
damnation.  ” 32 Once women become rebellious subjects, what Leontes in 
The Winter’s Tale calls “revolted wives, ” 33 Vives assures them that “All thy 
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country folks, all ryghtes and lawes, thy countrey it selfe, thy parentes, all 
thy kyns folke and thyn husbande hym selfe shall damne and punisshe 
thee: All mighty god wyll avenge moste rygorously his majeste so displesed 
and offended of the. ”34 These texts work to define the place of wives in 
relation to husbands as congruent with the subject’s relationship to the 
king in ways that resonate with Cary’s play. As Herod’s fury over Mariam’s 
behavior attests, obedience on the part of wives signifies an ordered soci-
ety, secure in its lines of authority, while disobedient wives signify a world 
disordered: chaos not only at home but in the realm.
To legitimize an ordered society, law in England—like Mosaic law 
in Cary’s play—connects to religious dogma. The Law’s Resolutions of 
Women’s Rights invokes Eve’s sin as that which brought women into subjec-
tion. Eve “because she had helped to seduce her husband hath inflicted on 
her an especiall bane. In sorrow shalt thou bring forth thy children, thy desires 
shall be subject to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee. See here the reason 
of that which I touched before, that Women have no voyce in Parliament, 
They make no Lawes, they consent to none, they abrogate none. ”35 
Perpetually paying for the sin of Eve, women have no public place, no legal 
voice. The religious narrative invokes a concrete origin for coverture that is 
as flimsy and mythical as the stability of the order itself. But the law makes 
fact out of fiction, limiting women’s rights on a day to day basis. “Section 
ix, That which the Wife hath is the Husbands” confirms that “[f ]or thus it is, 
If before Marriage the Woman were possessed of Horses, Neate, Sheepe, 
Corne, Wool, Money, Plate, and Jewels, all manner of moveable substance 
is presently by coniunction the husbands, to sell, keepe, or bequeath if 
he die: And though he bequeath them not, yet are they the Husbands 
Executors and not the wifes which brought them to her Husband. ”36 In 
this acute lack of proprietorial interests and legal standing, women cannot 
even file charges against husbands who beat them: “if a man beat an out-
law, a traitor, a Pagan, his villein, or his wife, it is dispunishable, because by 
the Law Common these persons can have no action. ”37 On the same level 
legally as traitors, pagans, and servants under common law, hemmed in by 
threats such as those Vives obliquely makes, and ill-positioned for acts of 




But what of women who offended neither family nor husband? 
What were the guarantees that a woman who fulfilled Vives’s ideals would 
receive the love and honor he promises or would never need to worry about 
property or money? Renaissance husbands’ economic and emotional neg-
ligence did not seem to be as reliably attached to their wives’ disobedience 
and loss of chastity as early modern moralists would have women believe. 
The cases of Elizabeth Stafford Howard, Duchess of Norfolk, Margaret 
Cuninghame, and Elizabeth Bourne, real women who were abandoned by 
their husbands, suggest some answers. These three women’s stories dove-
tail with the marital experiences of the three female characters I examine 
in Cary’s play because Norfolk, Cuninghame, and Bourne struggled with 
the financial, social, and emotional consequences of being married to men 
who abused and abandoned them. And, like Cary’s women, these women’s 
responses to their husbands’ abandonment is varied: Cuninghame com-
plains in a diary, Norfolk petitions for redress in letters (as Cary herself is 
driven to do in the 1620s), and Bourne seeks a divorce. These three real 
women’s narratives of marital betrayal demonstrate the rhetorical power 
women could achieve through writing letters and diaries, recording their 
complaints and perceived injustices. While there are many other cases 
to consider, these three resonate with the “cases” of Mariam, Doris, and 
Salome and illuminate both the fact of married women’s constraints and 
their defiance of those constraints.
* * *
Elizabeth Stafford Howard, Duchess of Norfolk, was imprisoned by her 
husband, Thomas Howard, third duke of Norfolk, when she objected to 
his bringing his mistress, Bess Holland, into her house. The unhappiness 
of the married couple became quite a scandal, as Betty Travitsky and Anne 
Lake Prescott note, primarily because the duchess wrote frequent and 
detailed letters to Thomas Cromwell, chief minister for Henry VIII, beg-
ging him to force her husband to increase her allowance.39 In particular, 
her letters testify to what she felt was distress caused by her husband’s 
neglect. On June 26, 1537, she wrote, “For if the King’s Grace granteth my 
daughter of Richmond her jointure (which he had never a penny for at her 
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marriage) . . . [my lord my husband] will not let me have the remainder 
of my jointure . . . though my lord, my father, paid two thousand marks 
with me with other great charges, . . . which my lord my husband hath 
forgotten now he hath so much wealth and honors and is so far in doting 
with that quean [Bess Holland] that he neither regardeth God nor his 
honor. ”40 The Duchess was shocked that her careful performance of wifely 
duty had not roused in her husband some form of loyalty and respect: “I 
have always lived like a good woman!” she lamented, “And here is poor 
reward I have in my latter days for my well doing!” (43). The letter compel-
lingly testifies to a competition between mother and daughter created by 
Norfolk’s abandonment. Evidently, the payment of her daughter’s jointure 
canceled out the Duchess’s ability to lay claim to her own, so that neither 
mother nor daughter had the assurance of money legally due them. The 
Duchess’s complaint reads much like that of Cary’s Doris, who rejects 
Herod’s grounds for divorce on the basis of her virtue and fertility. Neither 
the Duchess’s goodness nor her obedience to Norfolk won her favor from 
her husband and male relatives, so that Vives’s promises were unfulfilled. 
Like Cary’s Doris, the Duchess expresses both bewilderment and outrage 
at a system that had betrayed her.
Also suffering financial and emotional abandonment, Margaret 
Cuninghame recorded her marital experiences from 1598–1608 in “A 
Part of the Life of Lady Margaret Cuninghame, Daughter of the Earl of 
Glencairn, that she had with her first Husband, the Master of Evandale, 
The just and true Account thereof, as it was at first written with her own 
hand. ”41 The author demonstrates the insecurity and contingency of a 
woman’s position in marriage, so that a husband’s treatment of his wife 
becomes a product of arbitrary and overwhelming pressures that cannot 
be predicted or adequately explained. Margaret Cuninghame’s account of 
her marriage to Sir James Hamilton, the Master of Evandale, focuses on 
her husband’s unwillingness to support her financially despite the birth 
of children, and attempts by her father to persuade him of his marital 
responsibilities. While the couple were married in 1598, it was not until 
1601 that they lived together as husband and wife. She writes that, when 
she finally joined her husband, she “was boarded in a hostler house, while 
the next May following, and then I rode again to my Lord my father, being 
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great with bairn: and I bore with his Lordship my eldest son James, on 
4th of July, and I remained with his Lordship till the next February. Then 
I rode home to Evandale again, and was boarded in a hostler house six 
weeks, and then they would furnish me no longer, because they got evil 
payment. So then I was destitute, and I requested my goodfather and 
goodmother to deal with my husband to give me some reasonable money 
to live upon. . . .”42 She traveled back and forth between her parents’ 
home and various hostler houses where her husband boarded her without 
paying for her board. She was evicted from these hostler houses, gave birth 
to five children, and finally separated from her husband in 1608.
Cuninghame seems to imply that Hamilton treated her with par-
ticular and willful contempt, for there was a brief period of time in 1604 
when for a quarter of a year “he took [her] home to Evandale, where [she] 
remained with him, very lovingly used by him. ” But this idyll was inter-
rupted by her husband’s return to his former bad temper. He abandoned 
Cuninghame once more, “put[ting] both [my gentlewoman] and me forth 
of his house naked, and would not suffer us to put on our clothes, but said 
he would strike both our backs in two with a sword. ”43 His brief affection 
was portrayed as a stark and lonely alternative to his abuse; he could not 
be constrained either by law or by family and friends to maintain a stable 
home for his family. Cuninghame’s chronicle of her husband’s chaotic 
and brutal behavior resembles Mariam’s complaints against Herod, who 
threatens her with violence. The humiliation Cuninghame experienced, 
when evicted from hostler houses, when her husband sent her out of 
doors without her clothes, and when he ignored the birth of their children, 
forms a narrative that emphasizes the ultimate instability of women’s lives 
in an institution that is supposed to guarantee stability.44 Cuninghame 
was forced to depend on the benevolence of her parents, who came to her 
rescue on a number of occasions, but her marriage to him continued until 
the final break in 1608. Her apparent obedience and malleability did noth-
ing to endear her to him, proving how false are the guarantees of love and 
honor promised to women by moralists such as Vives.
Finally, in another case that exceeds the limits of a complaint or a 
diary, Elizabeth Bourne filed a document on December 6, 1582, to be read 
by Sir Julius Caesar, who was an Admiralty judge, a Master of Requests 
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and, later, Master of the Rolls in the Court of Chancery.45 In her com-
plaint, Bourne asks for permission from the Privy Council to divorce her 
husband, Anthony, for his refusal to live with her, his continual adultery, 
his financial negligence, and his threats against her life. “Mr. Bourne,” she 
alleges, was “in breach of his holy vowes of chast matrimonie; and hath 
lived, and still continueth in open sinne and shame with harlots, to the 
ruinne and spoile of himselfe, mee, and my children. ”46 Bourne’s complaint 
asks formally for the right to divorce her husband, a man whose philan-
dering brought her humiliation, poverty, threats from hired assassins, and 
the threat of the pox. Like Salome, Bourne claims a right to divorce her 
husband, despite the law’s clear bias against her.
The significance of Bourne’s request cannot be overestimated. 
Sixteenth-century English common law did not allow wives to divorce 
their husbands; in fact, under common law married women had few legal 
rights. Bourne’s self-assurance in her document, however, speaks to both 
her desperation and her sense of entitlement, so that it cannot be said with 
any comfort that married women’s official legal powerlessness automati-
cally bred in them a sense of victimization or inaction. In fact, as several 
historians have shown, wives sued their husbands for separation from bed 
and board relatively frequently in Ecclesiastical courts and also for financial 
independence in equity courts. Moreover, suing for slander or defamation 
often gave women a route to public speech.47 Thus, there existed a gap 
between theory and practice of law in early modern England that both 
limited and licensed women’s voices.48 Bourne’s chief complaint against 
her husband—that he engaged continually in adultery with harlots, evaded 
his economic responsibilities, and repeatedly threatened her life—demon-
strates her sense of the justice of her complaint and of her right to seek an 
utter divorce from him. The legal restrictions she faced are evident in her 
request, but they did not stop her from attempting to free herself from a 
man who tormented her life for sixteen years.
The law in early modern England was complex, governed by sev-
eral court systems, including Ecclesiastical, Equity, Custom, and Common 
law, all of which might have some jurisdiction on the subject of marriage 
and divorce.49 According to Laura Gowing, “England emerged from the 
Reformation with a uniquely unreformed canon law on marriage: while 
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Protestant states in Europe were moving towards separations which 
allowed at least the innocent party to remarry, England’s church courts 
remained empowered to do no more than grant judicial separations, ‘from 
bed and board.’ Such separations allowed couples to live apart, but pre-
cluded remarriage by either party, guilty or innocent. ”50 Maria Cioni, Amy 
Erickson, Tim Stretton, and Gowing have shown that when it came to real 
applications of the law, women of all classes made use of various court sys-
tems, bringing cases of libel, slander, and defamation, litigating for the right 
to separate property, and suing their husbands for legal separation and 
divorce, citing violent cruelty and adultery.51 Ecclesiastical courts could be 
used to enforce moral behavior, in particular sexual propriety, and allowed 
women to sue in their own name.52 Equity courts (such as the court of 
Requests and Chancery) were a venue for seeking relief outside common 
and ecclesiastical law. Stretton explains that the Masters (such as Sir Julius 
Caesar) viewed equity as a remedy to the inflexibility of rules of law, focus-
ing on the individual needs of parties.53 As a result, while married women 
did not officially have legal rights, there were courts sympathetic to their 
property disputes, the settlement of estates, and legal protection after legal 
separations won in the Church courts. Consequently, women could carve 
out a space to make their claims in systems of law, custom, and ideology 
that traditionally denied them such agency. In fact, equity courts worked 
precisely to allow women agency that they did not have under law, so that 
“equity” becomes literally that which is not found in law.54 Legal remedies 
were available to women despite the apparently inflexible nature of English 
common law, and they took full advantage of a number of legal avenues for 
pursuing what they evidently saw as their right to equity and independence 
before the law.
Divorce, however, was a very difficult matter. The legal standards for 
a divorce suit brought by either husbands or wives were extremely high, 
involving proofs of impotence, precontract, consanguinity, affinity, or tender 
age for a divorce a vinvulo matrimoni. And for a divorce a mensa et thoro, 
only proof of adultery, extreme cruelty, desertion, or bitter enmity could 
form a successful basis.55 As both Stretton and Gowing agree, wives’ claims 
of husbands’ adultery were never enough for either a legal sentence or for 
granting separation. A wife had to couple her complaints of adultery with 
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something else, usually violent cruelty and financial abandonment.56 Thus, 
Bourne accuses her husband of squandering her lands and money in order 
to maintain his mistress, and her accusation of adultery carries with it the 
accusations that he intended to infect her with syphilis and to murder her. 
When she refused to hand over her portion to finance his mistress, she 
writes, “he offered me the terror of his dagger, . . . with solemme othes 
vowed, hee would tearre the skinne of[f ] my backe; if he might not, he would 
blow up mee and my house with gunpowder, but he would be revenged and 
rid of mee. ” In Bourne’s case, according to Hill, “There was no ‘divorce’ as 
such—even a legal separation—but there was an interesting application of 
the P[rivy] C[ouncil]’s quasi-judicial authority which left her protected from 
her husband. . . . ”57 Bourne’s case is notable for her direct application to the 
Privy Council. As Greenberg shows, appeals to Parliament were effective 
because they were statutory, and “courts were bound to uphold them, even if 
they directly conflicted with common-law precedent. ”58 
What we have, therefore, is a profoundly contradictory and unreli-
able set of laws and practices. It is my contention that married women’s 
precarious and unpredictable legal standing in relation to their husbands 
produced in them their own set of anxieties about their status under the 
law. Cary’s The Tragedy of Mariam reflects such anxieties, performing cul-
tural and historical work that illuminates the experiences of women caught 
between contradictory socio-juridical liberties and constraints. Cary’s play 
dramatizes the anxieties to which women of the period might be subject, 
given their rank as daughters, wives, and widows, rankings that depended 
on women’s relationships to men. Cary’s portrayal of Doris’s nearly pas-
sive, though certainly vindictive, suffering, of Mariam’s verbally aggressive 
defiance of Herod’s authority, and of Salome’s active and unpunished pur-
suit of her desire, emphasizes the dynamic and plural nature of women’s 
responses to domestic and legal tyranny, responses that—like those of the 
angry, letter-writing Duchess of Norfolk, the record-keeping Margaret 
Cuninghame, and the divorce-seeking Elizabeth Bourne—were produced 




Cary’s The Tragedy of Mariam dramatizes the reciprocal nature of mas-
culine and feminine anxieties when Herod’s outrage at Mariam’s rebellion 
against him in Act Four forces her to depend on him for her life.60 When 
she coldly greets Herod, resists a happy reunion with him upon his return 
to Palestine, and refuses to accept his claim to grief over her brother’s death, 
Mariam refuses to guarantee unconditionally her husband’s desire. Herod’s 
ambition leads him to execute those who threaten his legitimate right to 
the throne and to divorce women he no longer finds useful. In response 
to her resistance, he threatens Mariam obliquely: “By Heav’n, you vex me, 
build not on my love” (4.3.147).61 But Mariam denies him the greeting 
that he desires and that she owes him as wife and subject when she retorts, 
“I will not build on so unstable ground” (148).62 Neither his growing dis-
pleasure nor his threats of punishment succeed in changing her position, 
so that her disobedience makes her a rebellious wife and subject. As Vives 
enjoins, there are two virtues of a wife, “chastite and great love towarde her 
husbande. ”63 Men’s requirement that women hold these complementary 
virtues leads Vives to argue that “all loves and charites” are broken by the 
loss of chastity, so that transgression of one virtue throws the others into 
doubt.64 And once chastity is questioned, a woman becomes a traitor: 
“What greater offense canne [women] do: … that destroye theyr country 
and perisshe all lawes and justice, and mourther their fathers and mothers, 
and fynally defile and marre all thynges both spirituall and temporall?”65 
According to Vives, Mariam’s rebellion calls into question all her virtues 
and subjects her to the scrutiny of both the state and her husband.66
Thus, Mariam’s rejection of Herod as a husband becomes in his 
mind a revolt threatening the purity of his line, his life, and his throne. 
Like the Duchess, whose letters to the king enraged her male relatives and 
made them fear for their own security at court, Mariam threatens Herod’s 
stability as a king.67 That Mariam’s speech should stimulate such anxiet-
ies points to the phantasmatic nature of female identity. Herod’s reaction 
against her conflates verbal disobedience with sexual betrayal: “Bright 
workmanship of nature sulli’d o’er, / With pitchèd darkness now thine end 
shall be: / Thou shalt not live, fair fiend, to cozen more, / With [heav’nly] 
semblance, as thou cozen’dst me!” (4.4.211–14). While her refusal to obey 
him, and therefore to confirm his power, contributes to his violence against 
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her, it is his assumption of her adultery—an act of petty treason—that 
seals Mariam’s fate.68 Devoid of logic, Herod’s reaction implies what the 
conduct manuals overtly argue: female rebellion, most often in the form 
of public acts such as speech, serves as evidence of loose sexual morals. 
Because the transmission of his crown depends on Mariam’s fidelity, on the 
inviolability of her body as a vessel of procreation, the least act of rebellion 
provokes his leap in logic. Speech, which for women is always character-
ized as a public act, equals infidelity; infidelity equals treason. For Herod, 
as for tract writers, chastity is the definitive signifier of his wife’s loyalty, 
goodness, and right to life. When Herod believes himself to be a cuckold, 
Mariam’s right to life ends. Cary’s play, however, rejects this cautionary 
tale by deconstructing the connection between punitive consequences 
and actual guilt. Mariam’s innocence problematizes any direct equation 
between chastity and honor. As with the Duchess of Norfolk, the rewards 
of chastity Mariam supposes are hers fail to materialize. 
Herod’s paranoia leads to Mariam’s death by decapitation, a sentence 
that grossly exceeds the threat posed by Mariam’s verbal aggression. The 
anxieties to which he is subject as an early modern monarch (in Cary’s 
construction though not, of course, in fact), invested in the purity of the 
female body as a sign of his power, animate his judgment against her life. 
Thus, Cary’s play stages the material basis for Mariam’s own anxieties 
about Herod’s return to Palestine, her rebellion against him, and her con-
cerns for her life and the lives of her children. As she says, she can build 
neither trust nor love on the unstable ground of Herod’s love for her, or 
on the unstable ground of his authority (4.3.148). In contrast to Herod’s 
fantastic basis for her punishment, Mariam’s worries extend out of the very 
real threat her husband poses to her and those she loves. Herod’s murder 
of her grandfather and brother, as well as his repeated order for Mariam’s 
execution, are graphic examples of his power, and when Mariam herself 
refuses to obey Herod’s wishes, her fears become reality.
Cultural expectations for female behavior serve to consolidate and 
simultaneously to remove anxieties about the fragility of male power; 
such expectations also stimulate Mariam’s anxieties. While she refuses to 
submit to Herod or to confess any wrong to him, Mariam worries about 
her own behavior as a wife. Being a good woman is an ideal with which 
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Mariam grapples privately, struggling with her culpability as a wife whose 
disobedience to her husband earns his violent wrath and contradicts the 
norms of her culture: “Had I but with humility been grac’d, / As well as fair 
I might have prov’d me wise” she acknowledges, “But I did think because 
I knew me chaste, / One virtue for a woman might suffice” (4.8.559–62). 
Mariam’s need to “live up to patriarchal ideas of femininity” illustrates her 
valuation of patrilineal conceptions of appropriate femininity.69 Mariam’s 
investment in these ideals constrains her acts. Like women who did not 
seek relief at court, as described by Barbara J. Harris, Mariam dies affirm-
ing cultural ideals of virtue and morality.70 Her speech resembles, in this 
regard, the penitent confessions of early modern anti-heroines who pay 
tribute to and affirm “appropriate” femininity.71 Like the Duchess, who 
is dismayed by her husband’s failure to acknowledge her obedience and 
honesty as his wife, Mariam insists on her virtue and, by doing so, rejects 
Herod’s view of her as “sullied” and as a rebel.
At the same time, Mariam realizes that the rewards promised her as a 
chaste woman are not just uncertain, but a fiction; innocence is not enough, 
for any woman can be accused and found guilty.72 Zimmerman points to 
the “slippery matter of perception” in her analysis of Cary’s motto “be and 
seem” and argues that the problem of “suspicion” or “show” becomes “not 
only as important as, but actually more important than, innocence itself; 
making ‘seeming’ more important than ‘being.’” 73 As a result, Mariam envi-
sions a life after death where her “soul is free from adversary’s power. / You 
princes great in power, and high in birth, / Be great and high, I envy not 
your hap. / Your birth must be from dust, your power on earth; / In Heav’n 
shall Mariam sit in Sarah’s lap” (4.8.570–74). Because earthly rewards are 
elusive, Mariam looks to heaven for the freedom she seeks. And she creates 
of it a matriarchal haven. The sanctuary and female community she finds 
in Sarah’s lap allow her to view Herod dispassionately, even sympatheti-
cally: in her last words (as reported by Nuntio), she predicts Herod will 
regret her execution (5.1.77–8); she has none of Constabarus’s vitriol as he 
curses Salome, but imagines Herod to be capable of grief. Her emancipa-
tion from Herod’s rule, however, is only bought by her death, which takes 
away from the victorious note of her speech. Thus, masculine anxieties 
are disclosed as threats to women’s lives. Mariam’s fluctuating and contra-
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dictory responses to the reports of her husband’s death and resurrection 
signify conflicted and confused feelings about the freedom his death brings 
and the submission his return requires of her. Her anxieties exist, in this 
regard, in an uneasy—both complementary and contradictory—dialectical 
reciprocity with those of her husband. 
When Doris confronts Mariam with the injustice of her divorce 
from Herod, the material basis for feminine anxieties comes into sharper 
relief. Doris’s complaint reveals the capriciousness of male authority under 
Mosaic law that does not require a man to provide compelling evidence for 
a divorce:
I am that Doris that was once belov’d,
Belov’d by Herod, Herod’s lawful wife:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
What did he hate me for: for simple truth?
For bringing beauteous babes, for love to him?
For riches, noble birth, or tender youth?
Or for no stain did Doris’ honour dim?
Oh, tell me, Mariam, tell me if you know,
Which fault of these made Herod Doris’ foe? 
   (4.8.583–4, 591–6)
Like Bourne, the Duchess of Norfolk, and Cuninghame, Doris wonders at 
her own unjustified desertion by her husband. Though Mosaic law gives 
husbands the right to divorce their wives and makes Mariam Herod’s 
legal wife, Doris challenges the basis of that law when she testifies to her 
spotless virtue as Herod’s first wife and, therefore, to his exploitation of 
the law. While the law itself appears impervious to such virtues, Doris’s 
performance of gender, as Clarke also notes, resonates with early modern 
tracts and custom as faultless, so that the law becomes unjust.74 Doris 
knows what Mariam has only just discovered: a woman’s spotless virtue is 
no guarantee of her husband’s love and loyalty.
Doris’s complaint accentuates the wrongs committed against women 
in inequitable systems of power, so that their anxieties about abandonment 
and violence are staged as having real and present bases. Her divorce from 
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Herod robs her and their son Antipater of the prestige and honor they 
once owned as much as they owned their names, so that her anxieties are 
attached as much to the need for prestige and honor as men’s are:
So long it is since Mariam’s purer cheek
Did rob from mine the glory, and so long
Since I return’d my native town to seek:
And with me nothing but the sense of wrong,
And thee dear boy, whose birth, though great it were,
Yet have thy after fortunes prov’d but poor:
When thou wert born, how little did I fear
Thou should’st be thrust from forth thy father’s door!
Art thou not Herod’s right begotten son?
Was not the hapless Doris Herod’s wife?
Yes: ere he had the Hebrew Kingdom won,
I was companion to his private life.
Was I not fair enough to be a queen?
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Yet thou ungrateful cast me off with scorn,
When Heaven’s purpose rais’d your meaner fate. 
   (2.3.223–35, 245–6)
Abandoned by Herod, Doris and Antipater suffer a dispossession that 
throws their identities into crisis. Herod’s unpredictable behavior, his 
self-interested use of power and law, lie at the root of Doris’s complaint. 
In contrast to Herod’s anxieties about Mariam’s infidelity, Doris’s anger is 
animated by actual events, by material effects—loss of status and inheri-
tance rights—rooted in Herod’s desertion of her. She wishes for “revenge,” 
and she hopes that her dispossessed son “before [Herod’s] bastards might 
be placed” (2.3.251, 256). Though Herod and Mariam have been married 
for some time, Doris seems to wander in a kind of fog. Like the Duchess of 
Norfolk, she is still stunned by the injustice of her husband’s behavior, still 
suffering its effects, hardly recognizing herself as the woman who was once 
respected, admired, and honored. While she rejects Antipater’s wish that 
“Mariam’s children might subverted be, / By poison’s drink, or else by mur-
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derous knife / So we may be advanc’d, it skills not how” (2.3.274–6), she 
curses Mariam and her children (4.8.609–24), and wishes them harm. As 
both Laurie Shannon and Naomi Miller have observed, Mosaic law forces 
women to compete against one another for their positions in society.75 
But Doris’s loss of identity, place, and position makes her neither maid, 
wife, nor widow, and confirms the materiality of her anxiety in contrast to 
Herod’s spectral fears.
Doris, like Mariam, remains invested in ideals of female honor and 
reputation. Thus, her interrogation of Herod’s tyranny is limited to railing 
at and blaming Mariam for Herod’s abandonment. She displaces her anger 
at Herod onto Mariam as a way of avoiding direct confrontation with laws 
and ideologies that have destroyed her status in society. So while Doris 
understands the law’s contradictions and the injustices the law creates for 
women, she does not actively work to subvert it. Like the women who did 
not take advantage of equity court systems to sue their husbands, Mariam’s 
and Doris’s responses to Herod’s abuse reflect the cultural pressures on 
early modern women not to threaten systems of law. Their reactions—fun-
damentally different in tone and effect, yet sharing an inability to improve 
their lives—demonstrate the diversity of women’s experiences in marriage 
and their common vulnerability to laws that benefit only men.
In Cary’s play, not only deserted and oppressed women show how the 
patrilineal order tyrannizes women and animates feminine anxiety. Salome 
offers a third response, expressing her own set of culturally derived fears and 
constraints, as well as the rebellion she plans against the law.76 While most 
scholars assume Cary’s identification with Mariam, I want to suggest that 
once Mariam and Doris become two parts of a trio completed by Salome, 
she speaks in ways that are consistent with the play’s views on marriage. 
That Salome is accused of transgressing her gender by male characters 
need not lead to the conclusion that she is vilified by Cary. Indeed, Ronnie 
Mirkin points out that “Elizabeth Cary manifested unfeminine traits . . . 
[and] was seen by her society as transgressing the prescribed boundaries of 
her gender, constituting her as a masculine woman. ” 77 If Mirkin is correct, 
and Cary herself behaved in ways that contradicted early modern notions 
of femininity, then perhaps Salome can be read as a complex complement 
and alternative to the other women in the play.78 The artificiality of gender 
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roles seems to be understood by Cary, so that her representation of Salome 
avoids moral condemnations in favor of creating a character who, as a 
function of plot, provides the play with its crux, with its problem, by both 
criticizing marital inequities and exploiting them.
This function must be seen within Cary’s frame for marriage and 
divorce, which I argue is monarchical tyranny. Salome’s first solution to 
her marital unhappiness with Constabarus is to seek legal redress. Murder 
is an extreme solution she resorts to only when the law fails her, so we 
must acknowledge the context of Salome’s actions within the political and 
legal designs of the play. Admittedly, Constabarus endorses the view of the 
early modern anti-feminist tracts on women’s nature (4.6.310–35), and 
the Chorus appears to endorse traditional notions of femininity. The play’s 
stance on Salome is, therefore, ambivalent. However, the figure of Salome 
unveils the arbitrary nature of appropriate and inappropriate configura-
tions of femininity which also haunts Mariam and Doris. As Karen Raber 
also points out, Salome identifies these notions as ideological constructs.79 
Moreover, her keen understanding of the kinds of oppression women 
face, as portrayed by Mariam’s and Doris’s experience with Herod, prob-
lematizes her position as a vice figure and as Mariam’s foil. Finally, despite 
conduct associating her with the women killed by friends and relatives in 
Vives’s tales, Salome survives unpunished, thus calling into question her 
position as vice figure as well. Her aggression, in contrast to the behavior 
of Mariam and Doris, forces questions about the tyranny of Mosaic law 
and absolute monarchy.
Salome’s pivotal role in the play is emphasized by her questions about 
the justice of Mosaic law, especially in terms of women’s inequality in relation 
to men. While her analysis is motivated by her desire to divorce Constabarus 
and to marry Silleus, she describes accurately Doris’s position as Herod’s 
cast-off wife. Salome’s claim that “Who hates his wife, though for no just 
abuse, / May with a bill divorce her from his bed” (1.4.335–6) is substan-
tiated by Doris’s complaint to Mariam, quoted earlier. Doris’s experience 
confirms that the justice of a husband’s rationale for divorcing his wife is 
as capricious as Salome attests. And, as I have shown earlier, Mariam, too, 
agrees with this understanding of Mosaic law. Salome’s veracity on this point 
lends her credibility when she speaks against the tyranny of women’s lack of 
Elizabeth Cary’s Female Trinity
84 EMWJ 2008, vol. 3
legal standing in marriage. The capriciousness of the law licenses husbands 
to desert their wives despite those wives’ fulfillment of their duties—despite 
their riches, beauty, obedience, subservience, and giving birth to sons. Salome 
admits that her hate for Constabarus is based on her desire for Silleus and 
convincingly argues that her reasons for seeking a divorce are no more ill-
founded than those of many husbands who divorce their wives:
If [Constabarus] to me did bear as earnest hate,
As I to him, for him there were an ease;
A separating bill might free his fate
From such a yoke that did so much displease.
Why should such privilege to man be given?
Or given to them, why barr’d from women then?
Are men than we in greater grace with Heaven?
Or cannot women hate as well as men?
I’ll be the custom-breaker: and begin
To show my sex the way to freedom’s door,
And with an off ’ring will I purge my sin;
The law was made for none but who are poor. . . .
   (1.4.301–12)
Salome argues that the laws on divorce enforce women’s subjection, allow-
ing husbands a God-given, absolute right over wives. She questions that 
right and exposes it as an ideological apparatus, cogently deconstructing 
men’s naturalized and legalized right to divorce.80 Because, in this play, 
women’s sexuality is regulated and commodified in part through the 
constant threat of divorce (and death), Salome’s call for women’s equality 
through appropriation of Mosaic law threatens the stability of patrilineal 
authority. She strikes at the heart of women’s inequality, precisely tracing 
the route to married women’s freedom through breaking and appropriating 
Mosaic law. Thus, Salome speaks directly against the injustices Mariam 
and Doris have suffered and acts, as they do not, to redress inequities that 
cause their suffering, both by arguing in favor of women’s access to divorce 
and by claiming the right to divorce for herself. Salome’s role as the third 
point of the triangle I am proposing is crucial, therefore, to reading the 
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play’s multiple interests in women’s responses to law and marriage.
Salome’s appropriation of the law resembles the appropriation of 
common law in the courts of Requests and Chancery. Since Masters like 
Sir Julius Caesar depended on common law for their rulings, but also 
flouted the laws on coverture to find in favor of married women’s suits to 
safeguard and retain property, we can see that “equity” is practiced in some 
real sense outside the law.81 If, as Stretton defines it, equity is “a body of 
principles developed in contrast to common law and statute law . . . to 
compensate for deficiencies caused by the strictness of common law[,]” 
then the term begins to refer to a radical correction of existing law, so that 
married women, once Requests or Chancery had ruled in their favor, were 
granted rights they officially did not have.82 Salome does not have the right 
to divorce her husband under Mosaic law. However, like the women seek-
ing relief in the equity courts and like Elizabeth Bourne in her letter to 
Caesar, she argues in favor of allowing women to divorce husbands in cer-
tain circumstances. Thus “equity” in Cary’s play resembles equity in early 
modern England, as a process of relief for those who cannot find remedy 
within the law.
What makes Salome evil in the eyes of the Chorus and earns her 
Constabarus’s vitriolic condemnation is her appropriation of men’s legal 
privileges, which he sees as a breach of a natural gender divide. “Are Hebrew 
women now transformed to men?” he asks: “Why do you not as well our 
battles fight, / And wear our armor?” (1.6.421–3). He draws on 1400 years 
of Jewish divorce law to define Salome’s wickedness (ll. 445–50). However, 
Salome’s disruption of the law points to its inequity on several levels, so 
that Constabarus’s point of view can hardly be seen as one endorsed by the 
play. Indeed, her motives for divorce contrast with those of Herod, who, 
despite his protestations of love for Mariam, married her to legitimize his 
right to the throne. Salome, on the other hand, declares to Silleus, “ ‘Tis 
not for glory I thy love accept, / Judea yields me honours worthy store: / 
Had not affection in my bosom crept, / My native country should my life 
deplore” (1.4.357–60). In a position of privilege that allows her to choose 
a husband based on her “affection” for him, Salome’s motives for divorce 
are a complex combination of love and hate. She identifies the basis of 
divorce as hate not because she is “as bad as” or worse “than the men,”83 but 
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because Mosaic law identifies the grounds for divorce as hate. Salome does 
not originate the tenets of the law but claims for women the rights given to 
men in an already established structure of relations. Following her brother, 
she abandons a spouse for selfish reasons and eliminates those who are 
enemies. When she cannot divorce Constabarus after Herod has returned 
to Palestine, she reveals his treason to Herod (Constabarus has defied 
Herod’s orders in regard to the Sons of Babas). While Salome’s behavior 
by early modern standards is clearly willful and, therefore, monstrous, she 
reveals the inconsistencies of Mosaic law and women’s relationship to it, 
so that the law may be seen as an uncomfortable and inadequate solution 
either for resolving marital unhappiness or for disciplining unruly wives. 
Salome is a symptom, therefore, of a larger disease that the play 
addresses. If this is a play in large measure about the inequity of legal and 
domestic relations between husbands and wives, it gets its logic from the 
frame of monarchy, which in the Renaissance was seen as the model for 
domestic relations (husbands are kings of miniature domestic kingdoms). 
In The Tragedy of Mariam, Herod’s rule is based on usurpation, expulsion 
of a first wife, and violent control of a second wife. In this play, marriage, 
law, and monarchy are institutions that confer power only on men, and 
wives are provided for at the whim of the husband, who inherits his author-
ity from the monarchical line (which we know, from An Homilie Against 
Disobedience and Willful Rebellion and Patriarchia, or The Natural Power of 
Kings, is not mitigated by usurpation).84 Doris’s abandonment by Herod 
is a palpable example. Marriage becomes, both in itself and in Herod’s 
practice, a tyrannical institution. Salome is a woman who is constrained 
by Mosaic laws on marriage and liberated by Herod’s example as both 
husband and king. In their world, husbands have power to discard wives, 
and kings have power to execute disobedient subjects. Salome brings both 
these powers together, first attempting to divorce her husband, and then 
resorting to his execution as a traitor. Salome’s appropriation of divorce law 
depends on Herod’s death. His absence occasions a suspension of law that 
opens a space for her claim to the right to divorce her husband. The news 
of his arrival, very much alive, returns Salome to plotting Constabarus’s 
death; she cannot pursue divorce outside the law, once the tyrant or enforc-
er of the law has returned to power, and the rest of her violence stems from 
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Herod’s return. Crucially, then, it is the inequity, even tyranny, in the law 
that drives her to violence against her husband, triggering questions about 
the wisdom and efficacy of a law that is not applied equally to all. She fails 
to divorce her husband, then, because she is a woman in a legal system 
that does not allow her that right, and not because murder is her preferred 
modus operandi. While Cary is writing a historical tragedy, it would have 
been easy enough for her to imagine a Salome who is herself capable of 
murder. The Renaissance theater is not devoid of murderesses. But Cary 
depicts a woman whose first thought is a legal divorce—or at least the 
appropriation of a legal right to divorce—and who turns to murder only 
when divorce is not an option.
Thus, we may say, following Butler in Psychic Life of Power, that 
Salome acts both in subjection to a patrilineal system and as an agent 
outside that system. She tries to assume power over her marriage, first by 
divorcing and then by executing her husband, both imitating and exceed-
ing the intents of the patrilineal system that denies her such rights. The 
contradictory nature of my claim rests within a reading of acts not as 
choices of free individuals, but as implicated in organized, complex, and 
contradictory workings of power that exist prior to and within Salome’s, 
or any subject’s, appropriation. As Butler explains,
Power acts on the subject, an acting that is an enacting; an irresolv-
able ambiguity arises when one attempts to distinguish between the 
power that (transitively) enacts the subject, and the power enacted 
by the subject, that is, between the power that forms the subject and 
the subject’s “own” power. . . . Moreover, what is enacted by the subject 
is enabled but not finally constrained by the prior working of power. 
Agency exceeds the power by which it is enabled. One might say that 
the purposes of power are not always the purposes of agency. To the 
extent that the latter diverge from the former, agency is the assump-
tion of a purpose unintended by power, one that could not have been 
derived logically or historically, that operates in a relation of contin-
gency and reversal to the power that makes it possible, to which it nev-
ertheless belongs. That is, as it were, the ambivalent scene of agency 
constrained by no teleological necessity.85
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I read Salome as working within the understanding of power explained by 
Butler. Salome’s attempt to appropriate Mosaic law, as she sees it, is a cor-
rection of the inequity built into the law. It is an attempt that demonstrates 
her use of power as a radical form of agency unintended by the law. At 
the same time, Salome deploys her power in ways that reproduce the law’s 
inequities and uses her social status as sister of the king to claim divorce 
(those who are poor must obey the law) and to arrange for Constabarus’s 
execution. Salome is, therefore, neither a free subject we must condemn nor 
a victim without agency. More than that, she is a character in a play who 
performs a critical—that is, interrogative—function, one who by what she 
does and how she does it calls attention to the inequities built into marital 
relations and the tyrannical basis for those inequities.
Clearly, the role Salome plays as social critic and nonconformist is 
one that cannot be assigned to a character such as Mariam, whose overall 
dramatic role is that of innocent victim. And Doris, while poignant in her 
complaint against Herod, is not quite the right character to take on the 
arrogation of power the play seems to demand. Salome, however, is the 
appropriate character to do so because she embodies an imaginary space 
of outlaw behavior. Salome’s desire for Silleus remains a violation of the 
law, but she rejects the anxieties that accompany definitions of appropri-
ate feminine behavior. Her repudiation of shame complicates the equation 
between transgressive desire and evil. Before declaring her love for Silleus, 
Salome considers the different direction her life might have taken in a 
speech that both echoes and parodies Mariam’s anxieties about appropriate 
feminine behavior:
   ’Tis long ago
Since shame was written on my tainted brow:
And certain ’tis, that shame is honour’s foe.
Had I upon my reputation stood,
Had I affected an unspotted life,
Josephus’ veins had still been stuff ’d with blood,
And I to him had liv’d a sober wife.
Then had I never cast an eye of love 
On Constabarus’ now detested face, 
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Then had I kept my thoughts without remove:
And blush’d at motion of the least disgrace:
But shame is gone, and honour wip’d away,
And Impudency on my forehead sits:
She bids me work my will without delay,
And for my will I will employ my wits. 
   (1.4.282–96)
In this speech, Salome comes the closest to expressing the conflict Mariam 
experiences between the appropriate, submissive behavior society expected 
of women, and the self-determination for which Mariam longs. But she 
surpasses Mariam by working toward a semblance of female power on 
earth rather than after death “in Sara’s lap” (4.8.574). The gap opened by 
the contradiction in the law on divorce—licensing one sex while forbidding 
the other—offers Salome the opening she requires to envision her rebel-
lion. Salome’s speech juxtaposes patrilineal injunctions for appropriate 
female identity with the interrogation of the naturalized order that osten-
sibly follows. While she seems to endorse the masculinist views of obedi-
ence and chastity as honor, she suggests that virtue is an affectation, a pose 
or performance, a matter of seeming rather than being, and therefore not 
an actualized or real state. Shame and honor, in Salome’s mind, are at war 
with independent thought and action—certainly at war with desire, with 
her will. But rather than worry about whether her feelings are virtuous, 
Salome casts off the anxiety her culture imposes on her gender and makes 
her own rules. Impudence, branded on her forehead, rather than fostering 
repentance, becomes personified as the voice of a liberated desire.
In this light, the anxieties expressed by Mariam about being a 
proper wife are deconstructed by Salome. Doris’s example demonstrates 
to Salome that, under Mosaic law, husbands can ignore their wives’ 
performance of their obligations. Thus, propriety and impropriety are 
equally slippery and arbitrary states. Salome’s rejection of obedience and 
submission—juxtaposed with her critique of women’s lack of power in 
marriage—makes her violence a product of gender inequities in absolut-
ist socioeconomic systems. That women’s economic and physical survival 
depends on the deliverance Salome proposes is substantiated by the mar-
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ital tyranny Doris and Mariam have faced as wives. Thus, Salome’s rebel-
lion revises the passive-aggression of Mariam and Doris as she traces 
the route to equity for women through an already existing legal system 
and simultaneously behaves as selfishly as Herod. As Goldberg notes, 
“Salome’s existence is entirely defined by the institution of marriage; 
even the rebelliousness of her promiscuous desire is situated within it. ”86 
Valbuena agrees, arguing that “while Salome’s ‘wit’ appeals to a seemingly 
progressive feminist ideology, she depends entirely upon men to achieve 
her ends. ”87 Salome’s alliance with marriage and dependence on men, 
according to Goldberg and Valbuena, complicate Salome’s feminism. 
However, I would like to suggest that feminism need not be defined by 
women’s rejection of marriage or their relationships to men, but by their 
recognition of the systems of power that determine their scope of choice. 
Salome’s feminism comes out of her usurpation of power that is reserved 
for men alone under Mosaic law, and her critique of that law. Indeed, 
she sees herself as a custom-breaker, one who will teach her sex freedom, 
and when she argues with Constabarus about the legality of her act of 
divorcement, she declares, “Though I be first that to this course do bend, 
/ I shall not be the last, full well I know” (1.6.435–6). Salome not only 
interrogates the double standard for a potentially corrupt constitution of 
legitimate grounds for divorce but also envisions her act as one that other 
women already desire and will claim. She may not, finally, bond with or 
do the other women any personal favors, but she speaks their anxiety and 
identifies its cause. She does so not just out of immorality but as a move 
toward more equitable marriage relations.88 If indeed Salome is immoral, 
then I would argue her immorality is produced by and is a reflection of 
a tyrannical system of marriage and monarchical relations that the play 
depicts as immoral. While she depends on men to achieve her ends, 
we might ask upon whom Salome, as a woman living in a patrilineal 
socioeconomic state, ought to depend in order to see her goals achieved? 
Her dependence on her brothers for her freedom is not at all a surprise 
when we read her acts in light of historical women’s dependence on men 
and family for legal equity in the period, women such as the Duchess of 
Norfolk, Margaret Cuninghame, and Elizabeth Bourne, who all depend-
ed on male relatives and advisors for protection from husbands.
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As argued earlier in this essay, masculine and feminine anxieties have 
a reciprocal relationship, one that suggests an endless process of reitera-
tion. Systems of preferment and power generate competition between men 
that materially affects the lives of men and women and animates circula-
tions of anxiety for those men and women. But if feminine anxieties have 
their own legitimacy, complementary but also contradictory to masculine 
anxieties—since the goals attached to each set of anxieties (freedom vs. 
control) necessarily conflict—then a space opens for analysis of female 
characters even when they confound early modern visions of “woman. ”89 
As the testimonies I have discussed above show, historical women suffered 
in material ways when husbands abandoned their financial and emotional 
duties. But more than adding to the history of women’s victimization, 
these documents illustrate women taking action. Thus, while the period 
seems to be dominated by the sentiments found in Vives’s Instruction and 
the Homilies—that women are inferior to men and therefore must live in 
subordination to them—women contradicted those notions in their let-
ters, written complaints, and law suits. As the examples of the Duchess 
of Norfolk, Cuninghame, and Bourne attest, women saw the inequity of 
the legal and domestic system and responded to it, like Cary’s women, in 
different ways, sometimes wishing for, sometimes pleading for, sometimes 
demanding equity.
The Tragedy of Mariam acts in dialogue with historical women’s texts, 
then, for all three of the female characters I have analyzed find themselves 
at odds with a law that does not acknowledge them, but which supports 
Herod’s capricious and absolute rule. While all three characters behave 
competitively to survive, an examination of their anxieties reveals the com-
plexity of their acts. Salome, initially a persuasive proponent of women’s 
rights, becomes violent in Herod’s brutal order, a system requiring male 
competition and denying women rights. Doris’s bitterness and her desire 
that Mariam experience abandonment and that her children suffer violent 
harm is a prime example of that system of competition. Doris was aban-
doned by Herod, not for infractions that made her a bad wife, but because 
a union with Mariam legitimized his usurpation of the throne. Mariam’s 
personal integrity in the face of Herod’s tyranny contrasts with her position 
as the “other” woman and her insensitivity to Doris’s suffering, so that her 
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role is also contradictory. With traditional notions of female subjectivity 
unsettled, the multiplicities of feminine anxiety animating the play’s action 
take center stage and win legitimacy against the overblown and orthodox 
interests of its men. Ultimately, then, Cary becomes the custom-breaker, 
staging a set of circumstances, unpredictable and even contradictory, that 
unveil the material basis for feminine anxieties and the necessity for equity 
between men and women.
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